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Constitutional Law-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CRIMINAL CON- 
TEMPT-THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-Muniz U. Hoffman, 422 
U.S. 454 (1975). 
Early in 1970, Local 21 of the San Francisco Typographical 
Union began picketing the publishing plant of a local newspaper. 
The newspaper responded by filing an unfair labor practice 
charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' Pur- 
suant to section lO(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, the 
regional director of the NLRB secured a temporary injunction 
prohibiting continued picketing while the NLRB7s decision was 
pending. Local 70 and its president, Muniz, were subsequently 
charged with both civil and criminal contempt for joining Local 
21 in its activities prohibited by the injunction. The district court 
denied the defendants' request for a jury trial, placed Muniz on 
probation for 1 year and fined Local 70 $10,000. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 
On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
Muniz and Local 70 argued that the district court's decision un- 
constitutionally deprived them of the right to trial by jury guar- 
anteed by article 11, section 2(3)3 and the Sixth Amendment.4 
Petitioners pointed out that 18 U.S.C. section l(3) implies that 
offenses punished by a fine over $500 are s e r i ~ u s , ~  and since the 
right to trial by jury attaches whenever the crime is serious, the 
petitioners claimed they were entitled to a jury? Petitioners also 
claimed a statutory right to trial by jury under 18 U.S.C. section 
3692, which provides for a jury "in any case involving or growing 
out of a labor dispute."' 
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court 
1. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 9 160(1) (1970). 
2. Hoffman v. Teamsters Local 70, 492 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1974). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2(3) provides, in pertinent part: "The Trial of all Crimes, 
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ." 
4. U S .  CONST. amend. VI provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." 
5. 18 U.S.C. 4 l(3) (1970) reads as follows: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which 
does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, 
or both, is a petty offense." 
6. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975). 
7. 18 U.S.C. 6 3692 (1970) reads, in pertinent part: 
In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States govem- 
ing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or 
growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt 
shall have been committed. 
550 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
held that despite the broad language of section 3692, the legisla- 
tive history indicated that the intended scope of the statute was 
limited to cases arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act? The 
Court also concluded that where the punishment imposed for 
criminal contempt is limited to a fine, the definition of petty and 
serious offenses contained in section l(3) does not control the 
constitutional right to trial by jury.g Other than a brief descrip- 
tion of the Court's treatment of the first issue, this case note will 
consider only the latter aspect of the Court's decision and its 
effect on the yet unresolved conflict between the judiciary's sum- 
mary contempt powers and the defendant's right to trial by jury. 
A. The Right to Trial by Jury 
Trial by jury originated in the English'common law where i t  
was considered a matter of right in both civil and criminal pro- 
ceedings? This right, however, was restricted to cases involving 
"serious" offenses; so called "petty" offenses were summarilyii 
punished.I2 These English practices became part of the common 
8. 29 U.S.C. $$ 101-15 (1970). 
9. 422 U.S. 454, 476-77 (1975). 
10. In the 18th century, Blackstone wrote of the English jury trial practice: 
Our law has, therefore, wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a 
presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the 
prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance 
of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince; and 
yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if 
exerted without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally 
named by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dis- 
patch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant 
declaration that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English 
law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that . . . the truth of every accusa- 
tion, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, 
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his 
equals and neighbors indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion. 
4 W. BLACKSTON, COMMENTARIES 349-50 (Wendell ed. 1854). 
11. "The term used in connection with legal proceedings means a short, concise, and 
immediate proceeding . . . and trial of a 'summary' character is a trial without a jury." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1604 (4th ed. rev. 1968). 
12. This fact was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, 300 U S .  617, 624 (1937): 
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses, 
commonly described as "petty," which were tried summarily without a jury, by 
justices of the peace in England, and by police magistrates or corresponding 
judicial officers in the Colonies, and punished by commitment to jail, a work- 
house, or a house of correction. 
5491 CASE NOTES 551 
law of the American Colonies13 and subsequently were incorpo- 
rated in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.14 
Article 111, section 2(3) of the Constitution and the Sixth Amend- 
ment provide for a jury in the trial of all crimes;15 the Seventh 
Amendment extends this right to all "suits a t  common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars."16 In light 
of this common law background, i t  was long held that the consti- 
tutional guarantee of trial by jury extended no further than the 
guarantee under the common law of 1789.'' More recent constitu- 
tional interpretations, however, have expanded the common law 
definition of "serious" crimes to include all criminal offenses 
where the defendant may be incarcerated for over 6 months.lThe 
Contra, Comment, Aggregating Multiple Contempts of Court: The Supreme Court Takes 
Another Step to Insure a Jury Trial, 20 S.D.L. REV. 438 (1975). The author suggests that 
England utilized summary proceedings for direct criminal contempts but juries for indi- 
rect criminal contempts. Another commentator claims that "until 1720 there is no in- 
stance in the common-law precedents of punishment otherwise than after trial in the 
ordinary course and not by summary process.'' Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress 
Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "lnferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa- 
tion of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1046 (1924). 
13. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 701-24 (1964) (considering the con- 
tempt proceedings of each colony). 
14. Incorporation was implied by the Court. This position, however, has had its 
critics both on and off the bench. See notes 88-99 and accompanying text infra; note 12 
supra. 
15. See notes 3, 4 supra. 
16. I1.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
17. The purpose of art. 111, $ 2 was to 
preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been recog- 
nized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as they might arise 
in the future . . . but not to bring within the sweep of the guaranty those cases 
in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded 
as a right. 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942). This position is also supported by Gompers v. 
United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914), wherein the Court said: 
But the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having 
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from 
English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; i t  is to be gathered not simply 
by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the 
line of their growth. It does not follow that contempts of the class under consid- 
eration are not crimes, or rather, in the language of the statute, offenses, because 
trial by jury as it has been gradually worked out and fought out has been thought 
not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right. 
18. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 
384 U.S. 373 (1966). In Cheff, the Court said: 
[IJn the exercise of the Court's supervisory power and under the peculiar power 
of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule further than 
sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by 
federal courts absent a jury trial or a waiver thereof. 
Id. at 380. 
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right to trial by jury has also been extended to civil cases involv- 
ing mixed questions of law and equity.'" 
B. Contempt Proceedings 
Contempt of court can be defined as any act or omission that 
disrupts or obstructs the judicial process.20 An act of contempt 
can be classified as either civil-initiated by a private party, or 
criminal-initiated by the court,21 and as direct or indirect, de- 
pending on whether it occurred within or without the courtroom.22 
At common law, the power to summarily punish for con- 
tempt was deemed an inherent and necessary power of courts to 
preserve the orderly administration of justice.23 This summary 
power was preserved in the federal judicial system as created by 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.24 Unrestrained by the buffering influ- 
ence of a jury, however, the broad language of the act soon led to 
abuses. A notorious example of such abuse was Judge Peck's 
summary imposition of criminal contempt sanctions on a disin- 
terested third party for out of court criticism of his decision in a 
case pending on appeal. This abuse led to congressional impeach- 
ment proceedings against Judge Peck." 
The day following the Peck proceedings, Congress began 
19. E.g., Beacon Theatres; Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958). 
20. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 185-86 (1971). 
21. Keller, Civil and Criminal Contempt, 43 N.D.L. REV. 244,244-45 (1967) (examin- 
ing the procedural and substantive differences between civil and criminal contempt). 
It has sometimes been said that a person incarcerated for civil contempt carries the 
keys to the jail since he will be released upon compliance with the relevant court orders. 
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 754 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
The Ninth Circuit defined criminal contempt as conduct against the authority and 
dignity of the court, an act which requires the "vindication of the court's authority and 
the punishment of a public wrong." In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1965). 
22. Direct contempt is contumacious behavior that transpires under the court's own 
eye and within its hearing. Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,308-09 (1888). "Indirect contempt 
is contumacious behavior occurring beyond the eye or hearing of the court and for knowl- 
edge of which the court must depend upon the testimony of third parties or the confession 
of the contemnor." United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1971). 
23. See Robertson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561, 565 (1924). In 1859, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi declared that: 
A court without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the 
lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recusant 
parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the 
age which invented it. 
Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (1858). 
24. Ch. 20, 9 17, 1 Stat. 83. 
25. For a full transcript of the proceedings before the House and the Senate see A. 
STANSBURY. REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833). A brief account is found in Nye 
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941). 
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work on the Judiciary Act of March 2, 1831. This legislation lim- 
ited the federal courts' summary contempt powers to acts occur- 
ring within the courtroom (direct contempts), but the right to 
trial by jury was not extended to any contempt  proceeding^.^^ 
Since the lower federal courts derive their existence and jurisdic- 
tion from congressional action,27 there is no doubt that Congress 
retained the authority to restrict what some have argued is the 
"inherent" authority of the federal courts to deal with acts of 
contempt .28 
C. The  Right to Trial by Jury in  Criminal Contempt Proceeding 
Since a t  common law neither criminal nor civil contempt was 
considered a crime, much less a serious crime, the right to trial 
by jury was not applicable. Largely as a result of continuing judi- 
cial abuseZg and congressional inaction, the Supreme Court in 
1964 began to impose additional restraints on the judiciary's exer- 
26. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487. The Act prohibited summary 
proceedings for contempt except where such contempt occurred in the presence of the 
court or near enough to obstruct justice. The present statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), 
enacted in 1948, incorporates the provisions of the 1831 act and limits the power of 
summary punishment to three situations: (1) misbehavior of any person in the court's 
presence or so near as to obstruct justice; (2) misbehavior of any of the court's officers 
in their official capacity; and (3) disobedience or resistance to the court's lawful writ, 
process or order. 
27. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts "shall have power . . . to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, a t  the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority 
in any cause or hearing before the same . . . ." 
The Supreme Court said in Ex parte Robinson, 86 U S .  (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873) 
that: 
These courts [district and circuit] were created by act of Congress. Their pow- 
ers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent 
acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The Act of 1831 [now 18 U.S.C. § , 
401 (1970)j is, therefore, to them the law specifying the cases in which summary 
punishment for contempts may be inflicted. 
28. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873). See generally J. Fox, 
THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927). 
29. The Court has recognized the unique potential for judicial abuse in summarily 
punishing criminal contempts. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex parte 
Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Court stated: 
[A] compelling argument can be made for providing a right to jury trial as a 
protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous 
conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human 
qualities of a judge's temperament. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [Tlhere has been a recurring necessity to set aside punishments for 
criminal contempt as either unauthorized by statute or too harsh. 
Id. a t  202, 206. 
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cise of contempt powers. In United States u. B ~ r n e t t , ~ ~  the Court 
refused to declare criminal contempt to be a crime. Therefore, 
whether or not the contempt itself was serious, there was no right 
to trial by jury?' The Court added, however, that if the punish- 
ment for the contempt were sufficiently serious there might be a 
right to trial by TWO years later,  in Cheff v. 
Schna~kenberg ,~~ the Court was asked to indicate what punish- 
ment was sufficiently serious to trigger this right. Although not 
formally adopting 18 U. S.C. section l(3) (defining petty offenses) 
as the standard, the Court referred to it and held that sentences 
for criminal contempt exceeding 6 months imprisonment "may 
not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver 
thereof. "34 Interestingly, the Court used a standard based on the 
difference between serious and petty crimes even though it had 
not yet declared criminal contempt to be a crime. This discrep- 
ancy was resolved in Bloom u. Illinois35 when the Court declared 
criminal contempt to be a "crime in every fundamental re- 
s p e ~ t , " ~ ~ h u s  meriting a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment 
when the contempt is serious.37 Without expressly referring to 
section 1(3), the Court held that in the absence of a jury or a 
waiver thereof, it is unconstitutional to impose a sentence of 2 
years imprisonment in an indirect criminal contempt proceed- 
ing? In .Duncan v. L o ~ i s i a n a , ~ ~  decided the same day as Bloom, 
the Court used the standard established by section l(3) to deter- 
mine whether a crime was serious, thereby entitling the defen- 
dant to a trial by jury. Again, however, the Court refused to 
expressly adopt the statute's standard.'O Finally, in Codispoti v. 
Penn~ylvania ,~~ the Court, without actually mentioning section 
1(3), adopted its 6 months imprisonment standard in criminal 
contempt proceedings arising in state courts. 
30. 376 U.S. 681 (1964). 
31. Fifty cases from 1812 to 1964 are cited in support of summary disposition of 
contempts without reference to any distiction based on the seriousness of the offense. Id. 
at 694 & n.12. 
32. Id. at 695 n.12. 
33. 384 U.S. 373 (1966). 
34. Id. at 380. 
35. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
36. Id. at 201. 
37. Id. at 202. 
38. Although the case dealt with indirect contempt, in dicta the Court suggested that 
the right to a jury trial might extend to direct contempts as well. Id. at 209-10. 
39. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
40. Id. at 161. 
41. 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974). 
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In its search for a standard to determine when the right to 
trial by jury attaches in both criminal and criminal contempt 
proceedings, the Court has often referred to section 1(3), but has 
never expressly adopted i t  as the standard. Furthermore, the 
Court has never addressed the question of how large a fine must 
be to trigger the right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceed- 
ings. Therefore, it is not surprising that when faced with requests 
for a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings, lower court 
decisions have varied greatly. Some courts have relied on the 
standard of section l(3) and have held that a criminal contempt 
punished by a fine over $500 was serious, requiring a trial by 
Other courts have refused to follow the statute, reasoning 
that the Supreme Court has not discussed fines and that they 
were therefore free to make their own determination of the seri- 
ousness of the contempt.43 Thus, when the Court considered 
Muniz, the only point of agreement among the courts was that 
trial by jury was required where the contemnor was sentenced to 
more than 6 months incarceration. 
In Muniz u. Hoffman, the Court confronted the same ques- 
tion that has divided the lower courts. That is, how large must a 
fine for criminal contempt be for the offense to be considered 
serious with the attendant right to a trial by jury? As a corollary 
to that issue, Muniz also presented the question of whether sec- 
tion l(3) should control the classification of criminal contempts 
as petty or serious. 
Before reaching these issues, the Court considered the peti- 
tioners' claim to a statutory right to trial by jury under 18 U.S.C. 
section 3692.j4 Despite its broad language guaranteeing the right 
to trial by jury "in any case involving or growing out of a labor 
dispute," the Court noted that the statute was intended to be a 
42. E.g., Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. R.L. 
Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971); County of McClean v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc., 51 
111. 2d 353, 282 N.E.2d 720 (1972). See also United States v. Merrick, 459 F.2d 644 (4th 
Cir. 1972) (18 U.S.C. Ej l(3) quoted as the legislative definition of the maximum penalty 
that may be considered petty); Blue Jeans Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969) (referring to the threshold established by 
18 U.S.C. 0 l(3)). 
43. E.g, Clark v. Boyton, 362 F.2d 992, 999 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1966); Seven Rivers 
Farm, Inc. v. Reynolds, 84 N.M. 789, 508 P.2d 1276 (1973); In re Jersey City Educ. Ass'n, 
115 N.J. Super. 42, 278 A.2d 206 (Super. Ct. 1971); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 
242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y .S .2d 625 (1968). 
44. The pertinent part of Ej 3692 is quoted a t  note 7 supra. 
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mere recodification of section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act? 
Since Muniz arose under the Taft-Hartley Actd6 and was not cov- 
ered by the Norris-LaGuardia jury trial provisions, the Court 
concluded that section 3692 did not apply." Justices Stewart, 
Marshall, Powell, and Douglas dissented on the ground that the 
plain meaning of section 3692 should govern its interpretation, 
not prior interpretations of section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act .dn 
The Court then considered the union's second claim,'g that 
the imposition of a $10,000 fine rendered the contempt a serious 
offense under the standard of section l(3) and that, consequently, 
its demand for a trial by jury under article 111, section 2 and the 
Sixth Amendment had been erroneously denied. This claim pre- 
sented the Court with an issue of first impression; that is, whether 
a right to trial by jury exists when a criminal contempt is pun- 
ished by a fine unaccompanied by in~arcera t ion.~The majority 
rejected the proposition that all criminal contempts are serious 
per se. Rather, it concluded that in light of the fundamental 
differences between fines and imprisonment, the seriousness of a 
contempt in which a fine alone was imposed must be evaluated 
on a case by case basis. Futhermore, the standard of section l(3) 
was held not to control the petty/serious determination required 
by the common law gloss on the Con~titution.~' Having rejected 
this standard, however, the Court failed to provide another objec- 
tive standard upon which to base the petty/serious determina- 
tion. Rather, noting that the union collected dues from 13,000 
members, the Court held that "the fine of $10,000 imposed on 
Local 70 in this case was [not] a deprivation of such magnitude 
that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or 
mistake.''52 
45. 422 U.S. 454, 462-63, 467-69 (1975). 
46. 29 U.S.C. $ 4  141-97 (1970). 
47. 422 U.S. at  467, 474 (1975). 
48. Id. at  478 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 484 (Stewart, J. ,  dissenting). 
49. Muniz did not join with the union in asserting this claim because he was merely 
placed on probation for 1 year. In Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), the 
Supreme Court rejected the claim that a sentence of 3 years probation was serious and 
therefore merited a trial by jury. Referring to the statute defining petty and serious 
offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), the Court pointed out that the statute only mentions penal 
sanctions and monetary fines, making no reference to probationary penalties. Since the 
Court refused to grant a jury trial on the basis of the 3-year probationary penalty in Frank, 
silence on this matter in Muniz is understandable. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 
476 (1975); 69 MICH.L. REV. 1549, 1562-63 (1971). 
50. 422 U.S. a t  476. 
51. See id. at 476-77. 
52. Id. at  477. 
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Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the plain meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand in all 
criminal proceedings.13 He further argued that even assuming 
that the petty/serious dichotomy was appropriately applied in 
Muniz," "it is impossible fairly to characterize either the offense 
or its penalty as 'petty.' "5J 
A. Consequences of Muniz 
The Court's refusal to adopt the objective standard of section 
l(3) in applying the petty/serious standard of the Sixth Amend- 
ment creates more confusion in an already uncertain area of the 
law. By the time Muniz reached the Supreme Court, it was clear 
that the seriousness of criminal contempts, now deemed crimes 
by virtue of Bloom, was to be measured by the penalty actually 
imposed." I t  was not clear, however, what standard would be 
used to distinguish between petty and serious criminal con- 
temptseJ7 
In the past, the Court understandably has been influenced 
by section l(3) since that section seemed well suited as a standard 
for classifying petty and serious crimes. Unfortunately, the Court 
has used this statute inconsistently. At times, it has referred to 
and relied on the statute without expressly adopting its terms; 
other times, the Court has ignored the statute.58 For example, in 
Duncan the Court referred to section l (3)  and relied on its stan- 
dardJ%ut refused to specifically adopt it, stating, "we need not, 
53. Id. at 479-80. In an earlier case Justice Douglas expressed a similar view. Noting 
that Congress has not attempted to isolate petty contempts, he contended that it is 
improper for the Court to do so. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,392 (1966) (Doug- 
las, J., dissenting). 
54. Justice Douglas has argued that the Court should not apply a pettylserious test 
in the absence of legislation isolating petty from serious criminal contempts. See Cheff v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 393 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
55. 422 U.S. at 480. 
56. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 211 (1968). 
57. See notes 42, 43 and accompanying text supra. 
58. Compare Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968) with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and Codispoti v. Pennsyl- 
vania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974). 
59. The Court's language, however, encompasses more than the standard of 18 U.S.C. 
4 l(3): 
In determining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the 
seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to receive a jury trial, we are 
counseled by District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, to refer to objective 
criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation. In the federal 
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however, settle in this case the exact location of the line between 
petty offenses and crimes."" Yet the opinion in Bloom u. Illinois, 
written by the same author as Duncan, failed even to refer to the 
statute? Finally, in Muniz, the Court refused to rely on the stat- 
uteee2 
The Court's rejection of the objective standard of section l (3)  
is understandable given the legislative history of the statute. 
Early versions and congressional records suggest that the statute 
was intended to unclog criminal calendars by eliminating the 
need for a grand jury indictment for petty offenses." Further- 
more, the House proceedings reveal no expectation tha t  the 
petty/serious standard established therein would control the right 
to trial by This history, together with the fact that section 
l (3)  existed in one form or another for over 35 yearss5 without even 
being referred to as a factor in determining the right to a jury trial 
in criminal contempt or criminal makes it clear that Con- 
gress never intended it to be used for this purpose.67 
Rejection of the statute has two important consequences. 
First, the rejection demonstrates that the Court's characteriza- 
tion of an offense as serious if the punishment exceeds 6 months 
incarceration is the result of judicial alteration of the common 
law? Second, when only a fine is imposed for contempt, there is 
no objective standard for determining whether the offense is petty 
or serious. This leaves the constitutional right of trial by jury to 
the discretion of judges subject only to appellate court review. 
Each case will require unique analysis of its facts and merits.69 
system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six 
months imprisonment and a $500 fine. 
391 U.S. a t  161. This statement suggests that societal attitudes toward criminal contempt 
may influence judicial assessment of seriousness. Although the Court stated that legisla- 
tive enactments especially reflect societal attitudes, other expressions of public sentiment 
might similarly influence the judges. See also Note, Criminal Contempt and Trial by Jury, 
8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 76, 90-100 (1966). 
60. 391 U.S. a t  161. 
61. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
62. 422 U.S. 454 (1975). 
63. See Act of Dec. 16, 1930, ch. 15, 46 Stat. 1029-30; 72 CONG. REC. 9991-94 (1930). 
64. See 72 CONG. REC. 9991-94 (1930). 
65. See note 63 supra. 
66. It was first used for this purpose in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). 
67. The $500 maximum provision of 18 U.S.C. 8 l(3) has remained unaltered in the 
course of subsequent recodifications. Failure to adjust the amount in light of inflation 
casts further doubt on the theory that the statute was intended to categorize crimes as 
petty or serious with jury trial consequences. 
68. See notes 12, 17 supra. 
69. One might ordinarily think that only criminal contempt cases involving fines over 
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Indeed, until the Supreme Court reviews a case, the trial judge 
will not know with certainty whether he should have impaneled 
a jury. 
B. Evidence of the Contemnor's Financial Status i n  
Determining His Right to a Jury Trial 
1. In general 
Although the Court is unwilling to apply the precise provi- 
sions of the statute, it considers the actual penalty imposed to be 
important in assessing the seriousness of the criminal contempt.70 
In Muniz ,  the Court considered not only the size of the fine 
actually imposed, but also the union's ability to pay the fine." 
Consideration of this factor is unusual. In the civil setting, evi- 
dence of a defendant's financial condition is generally considered 
irrelevant72 and unfairly p r e j~d i c i a l ,~~  except on the issue of puni- 
tive damage~.~"irnilarly, except for its potential use in sentenc- 
ing,75 the question of a defendant's wealth would rarely arise in a 
criminal trial.?"ts use in a criminal contempt proceeding, while 
analogous to the punitive damages context and punitive phase of 
a criminal trial, is not wholly the same. But since fines for crimi- 
nal contempt, like punitive damages and criminal punishment, 
are arguably aimed at  deterrence, it seems appropriate to con- 
sider financial condition.77 
The issue in Muniz, however, was not the size of the fine 
necessary to insure sufficient deterrence, but the size of the fine 
that would warrant a jury When the deterrence considera- 
$500 would require review regarding seriousness. This may not be so, however, since in 
certain circumstances even a fine under $500 may be held to be serious. Another unan- 
swered question is how the Court will look on imprisonment terms under 6 months accom- 
panied by fines of varying sizes. 
70. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). 
71. 422 U S .  a t  476-77. 
72. "The existence or non-existence of the defendant's wealth or financial support is 
wholly irrelevant when it comes to compensatory damages." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF REMEDIES 218 (1973); see FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. 
73. See FED. R. Evln. 403. 
74. See, e.g., Bowers v. Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., 148 S.C. 161, 165, 145 S.E. 790, 791 
(1928); Marriott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705, 710, 93 P. 875, 878 (1908). 
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); cf. United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
76. See FED. R. Evrn. 401, 402. 
77. See also note 21 supra. 
78. 422 U.S. a t  476. 
The holding of Munit was limited to its facts: a $10,000 fine imposed on an unincor- 
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tion is absent, the relevance of a defendant's wealth seems to 
disappear. If it is accepted that the wealth factor is not applicable 
to individuals in the jury trial determination, there is no reason 
that can justify the use of a different standard for associations 
and corporations since they too are constitutionally guaranteed 
the right to trial by jury.79 On the other hand, if, as the Court 
implied in Muniz, a defendant's wealth is considered in the deter- 
mination of its right to a trial by jury, there is arguably a violation 
of the defendant's right to equal protection under the laws. 
2. Equal protection 
Under equal protection case law the Court applies a strict 
scrutiny test to discriminatory legislation that either is based on 
suspect classifications or burdens fundamental rights.Vn the 
absence of a compelling state interest, which has rarely been 
found by the Court, such legislation is invalidated under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Rt 
Recent case law has dealt with the question of whether 
wealth is a suspect classification. In Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections," the Court stated that "[llines drawn on the basis of 
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfa- 
v ~ r e d . " ~ ~  Although the Court invalidated the legislation under the 
strict scrutiny test since i t  burdened a fundamental inter- 
est-voting-the Court appears to have been influenced by the 
use of wealth as a c l a s ~ i f i c a t i o n . ~ ~ n  Sa Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez," however, the Supreme Court did 
not treat wealth as a suspect classification since there had been 
no discrimination against a definable category of persons result- 
porated labor union collecting dues from 13,000 members. In rejecting the plea to apply 
18 U.S.C. 15 l(3) the Court stated that: 
It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a serious 
matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a 
$501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union. 
422 U.S. a t  477. Given the narrow holding of Muniz, there is a possibility that the over 
$500 fine standard may still be viable for measuring the seriousness of traditional crimes 
(in contrast to criminal contempts). 
79. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
80. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role 
for Equal Rotection, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89. 
81. Id. a t  94, 103-04. 
82. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
83. Id. a t  668 (citations omitted). 
84. Id. a t  670. 
85. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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ing in the absolute deprivation of the alleged right.V?he Court 
also rejected the claim that since the legislation burdened a fun- 
damental right-public education-the strict scrutiny test 
should be applied. According to the Court, the right to a public 
education did not qualify as a fundamental right since i t  was not 
protected by the Constitution expressly or by reasonable implica- 
tion .X7 
Using wealth as a factor to determine the right to a jury trial 
raises equal protection issues similar to those raised in Harper 
and Rodriguez. Concededly, this discrimination is judicial, not 
legislative; but this distinction is unimportant for purposes of 
appraising the wisdom of the Court's position. This position, were 
it legislatively based, would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 
The right to trial by jury is a fundamental right even by the 
Rodriguez standard since i t  is expressly protected by the 
Constitution. Such a fundamental right, when burdened by a 
classification based on wealth, as in Harper, is even more certain 
to be protected by the equal protection clause. Furthermore, dis- 
crimination on the basis of wealth in this setting arguably meets 
the Rodriguez requirements for a suspect classification. Whereas 
im Rodriguez the class subject to discrimination involved a mix- 
ture of poor and non-poor within geographic districts, the judicial 
discrimination in Muniz was directed only against those with 
greater financial resources. In addition, the plaintiffs in 
Rodriguez were not absolutely deprived of the right to a public 
education; in Muniz, a wealthy defendant was deprived abso- 
lutely of the right to trial by jury. I t  seems inconsistent for the 
Court to burden the fundamental interest of trial by jury by dis- 
criminating on the basis of wealth when the Court routinely 
strikes down legislation having the same effect. 
C. Abandonment of the PettylSerious Distinction 
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of limiting the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to serious offenses. Justices 
Black and Douglas have consistently argued that the plain lan- 
guage of the Sixth Amendment affords the right to trial by jury 
to "all" crimes regardless of their ser iousne~s .~  Since the Consti- 
- 
86. Id. at 25. 
87. Id. at 35. 
88. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1969) (Black, J., dissent- 
ing); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 391 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 724 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 
356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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tution itself does not distinguish between petty and serious offen- 
ses, they argue, the Court should not create a d i s t i n c t i ~ n . ~ ~  This 
proposition is supported by the Seventh Amendment, which 
guarantees a trial by jury in suits a t  common law where the value 
in controversy exceeds $20. It is improbable that the framers 
intended litigants to be protected in cases involving such a tri- 
fling amount, yet not be protected where the risk is imprisonment 
or a fine much greater than $2O? 
A similar position has been adopted in a t  least two states. 
California, for instance, constitutionally guarantees a jury trial 
for any person charged with a public offense.g1 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska interpreted the Alaska Constitution, 
the relevant language of which is virtually identical to the Sixth 
Amendment,92 as extending the right to a jury trial to all criminal 
defendants who wish one.g3 The court indicated that there is no 
good reason to draw a line between petty and serious offenses. It 
rejected policy arguments based on overburdening the judicial 
system as inapplicable when discussing the extent of constitu- 
tional protections, and rejected the common law history as sti- 
fling "a progressive development of our legal  institution^."^^ The 
wisdom of rejecting the petty/serious dichotomy is suggested by 
these and other arguments made by Justices Black and D o u g l a ~ . ~ ~  
In the alternative, Justice Douglas has argued that all crimi- 
nal contempts should be treated as serious given the serious na- 
ture of some criminal contempts and the severe fines imposed on 
~thers.~"ccording to Justice Douglas, any offense that carries 
with it the social stigma of being a crime merits a jury;g7 he points 
89. In place of the common law pettyherious distinction, Justices Black and Douglas 
proposed a violation/crime test. According to this proposal, criminal defendants would 
have a right to trial by jury whereas those charged with a mere violation, like a traffic 
violation which carries with it no criminal stigma, would not. See Baldwin v. New York, 
399 1J.S. 66, 76 & n.2 (1970); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-1 (1966). 
90. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633-34 (1937) (McReynolds 
81 Butler, ? J d . ,  dissenting). 
91. CAI.. CONST. art. I, 5 7. 
92. AI.AS. CONST. art. I, 4 11 provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve except that the legislature may 
provide for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in courts not of 
record. 
93. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
94. Id. at  396. 
95. See notes 53, 88 supra. 
96. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-86 & nn.2-3 (1966) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
97. See note 89 supra. 
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out that criminal contemnors are treated for all intents and pur- 
poses as ordinary criminals. Furthermore, the maximum poten- 
tial sentence, not the sentence actually imposed, should be the 
relevent factor in determining how society looks at  an offense. 
Although no maximum sentence is imposed by law in cases of 
criminal contempt, it is clear from the severity of sentences that 
can be and have been imposed that society views the offense as 
serious.Yn Justice Douglas does not deny that some criminal con- 
tempts might be petty, but contends that "[ulntil the time when 
petty criminal contempts are properly defined and isolated from 
other species of contempts . . . punishment for all manner of 
criminal contempts can constitutionally be imposed only after a 
trial by jury."Yg 
Both Justice Douglas' initial and alternative positions lead 
to the same result-the extension of the right to trial by jury to 
all criminal contempt proceedings. Although this extension elimi- 
nates the need to make the petty/serious detemination on a case 
by case basis, it also completely divests judges of summary con- 
tempt powers that arguably are needed to control the administra- 
tion of justice. 
D. Legislative Solution to the PettylSerious Dichotomy 
The ramifications of abandoning the pettylserious distinc- 
tion, especially with respect to judges' control of the administra- 
tion of justice, would be significant. The Court has recently sug- 
gested that  congressional actionloo might solve the dilemma 
caused by the conflict between the judiciary's need to maintain 
order in the court and the need to determine which criminal 
defendants are entitled to a trial by jury.'" Under this legislative 
approach, courts would not make subjective determinations on 
an ad hoc basis, but could work with an objective standard by 
which the offense punishable by fine would be classified as petty 
or serious according to whether its maximum penalty exceeded 
the legislatively established threshold. Two obstacles must be 
98. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-86 & nn.2-3 (1966) (Douglas, J. ,  dis- 
senting). 
99. Id. at 393. 
100. Some have suggested that the legislature, not the judiciary, should institute 
appropriate reforms in this area of the law. See Patterson, Criminal Contempt: A Proposal 
for Reform Providing "The Least Possible Power Adequate to the End Proposed," 17 
S.D.1,. REV. 41, 64 (1972). 
101. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 
U.S. 454, 476 (1975). 
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overcome before this approach becomes viable. First, Congress 
must legislate a maximum penalty for criminal contempt.lm Sec- 
ond, Congress must enact a statute establishing a threshold be- 
tween petty and serious crimes.'" If Congress were to enact such 
legislation, or clearly manifest intent that 18 U.S.C. section l(3) 
be used for such purpose,Io4 the process by which the right to a 
jury trial in federal criminal contempt cases is to be determined 
would be clear. 
Without basing the petty/serious criteria on constitutional 
grounds, however, the Court would still have to decide requests 
for a jury trial in criminal contempt cases arising in state courts 
on a case by case basis. Although it is true that the right to trial 
by jury has been extended to state proceedings by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ln%ny federal statute attempting to con- 
trol the right to trial by jury in state proceedings would likely be 
held invalid as a congressional exercise beyond its power. 
Given their disadvantages, the solutions considered above 
are not entirely satisfactory. One approach not yet fully explored 
appears to be the most efficient: the establishment by the Su- 
preme Court of objective criteria with which to make the 
pettylserious determination deemed inherent in the Sixth 
Amendment. ' "This  solution would sufficiently clarify this dis- 
concerting area of the law so as to avoid the case by case analysis 
presently required. In addition, the Court would no longer need 
to consider the financial circumstances of the contemnor, a con- 
sideration that appears to deny equal protection of the laws as 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment right by objective judicial creiteria would 
guarantee the right to trial by jury in state, as well as federal, 
proceedings by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.ln7 
102. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 391 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
103. See generally Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the 
Prowcutor ctnd the Grclnd Jury, 73 M I C H .  I,. REV. 483, 494 (1975). The author proposes 
that all criminal contempts be treated for all purposes as ordinary criminal prosecutions 
and indicates needed legislative reforms. 
104. In Muniz the majority declared that "criminal contempt, in and of itself without 
regard for the punishment imposed, is not a serious offense absent legislative declaration 
to the contrary . . . ." 422 U.S. a t  476. 
105. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
106. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra. 
107. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
